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The patent system was initially designed to provide incentives to develop
stand-alone innovations in elds such as mechanics, chemicals or pharmaceu-
ticals. Its application is therefore problematical in more recent elds such as
biotechnology and ICT industries, where innovation patterns are di¤erent. A
well-known problem concerns cumulative innovations. Patent law must then
trade o¤ the rights granted to upstream patent owners with the incentives to
develop subsequent innovations (Scotchmer, 1991; ODonoghue, Scotchmer and
Thisse, 1998; Denicolò, 2000). Another issue concerns complementary innova-
tions, which are the focus of the paper.
When nal products embody several complementary innovations, the scat-
tering of patents between various owners jeopardizes the commercial exploitation
of the products because of negotiation and royalty stacking issues (Merges &
Nelson, 1990; Heller & Eisenberg, 1998; Shapiro, 2001). In biotechnology, this
is the case of therapeutic proteins or genetic diagnostic tests that require the
use of multiple patented gene fragments (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998). It is also
very frequent in ICT industries such as electronics, computer hardware and soft-
ware, where rms have to navigate "patent thickets" (Shapiro, 2001). Shapiro
(2001) reports, for example, that in the semi-conductor industry rms receive
thousands of patents each year and manufacturers can potentially infringe on
hundreds of patents with a single product". The situation is similar in the U.S.
software industry, where there are potentially dozens or hundreds of patents
covering individual components of a product(FTC, 2003).
I study the problem of the production of complementary innovations in a
model of dynamic R&D competition between two rms, and argue that in some
cases complementary innovations should not be patentable as such, but bundled
with other innovations prior to patenting. To do so I consider two complemen-
tary innovations and examine whether they should be patented separately or
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as a bundle. This approach echoes several papers on cumulative innovations
where patentability requirements are dened as the need to develop two or
more successive innovations before obtaining a patent (Scotchmer and Green,
1990; Hunt, 1995; ODonoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse, 1998; Denicolò, 2000).
As regards complementary innovations, the optimal patenting rule depends
on a trade-o¤ between the prot loss due to scattered complementary patents,
and the possible benet of patent disclosure. The scattering of complementary
patents between di¤erent owners creates a double marginalization issue. Since
each patentee behaves as a monopolist, the Cournot (1838) theorem predicts
that prices do not maximize the rmsprots (Shapiro, 2001; Lerner & Tirole,
2005)1 . The requirement that complementary innovations be bundled prior to
patenting can be a way to prevent this prot loss. However, small innovations are
not disclosed when innovations have to be bundled prior to patenting (Scotchmer
and Green, 1990). As a result, rms lose the possibility to quit the race after a
rst innovation has been patented, which leads to R&D cost duplications.
I show that patent disclosure has a positive social e¤ect, although it does not
permit a fully e¢ cient coordination between rms. In this context, bundling
innovations prior to patenting can be more e¢ cient if innovations can be devel-
oped quickly. As I argue in the Conclusion, this condition is consistent with the
legal denition of the "inventive step" patentability requirement.
The paper is structured in six sections. First, the model is introduced in Sec-
tion 2. Section 3 then considers the case in which innovations can be patented
separately, while Section 4 focuses on the case in which they must be bundled
prior to patenting. Section 5 compares the social outcomes of the two require-
ments. Finally, Section 6 concludes and discusses the policy implications of the
model.
1To overcome this problem, patent holders can cooperate to lower their royalties by de-
signing an appropriate cross-licensing agreement. Still, such agreements are not however
systematic and their negotiation and monitoring also generate substantial transaction costs.
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1 The model
I consider a technology which consists of two complementary innovations. These
two innovations are assumed to be pure complements. Both are essential to
exploit the technology, and they have no use when isolated from each other. A
monopolist exploiting the technology makes a prot .
The R&D setting is derived from Scotchmer and Green (1990). The timing
of each innovation follows the same Poisson discovery process with a hit rate 
per unit of time and per innovation. Thus the expected research time for an
innovation is 1 . I normalize the R&D cost per unit of time and per innovation
to one monetary unit. As a result, the cost of developing an innovation is
determined only by the Poisson hit rate of the R&D process, independently
of any considerations regarding the price of research inputs. Contrary to the
model of Scotchmer and Green (1990), the two innovations that constitute the
technology are not cumulative: their development processes are independent
and simultaneous.
Two identical rms compete in R&D for developing the technology. The
discount rate is denoted by r. I make the general assumption that:

2
  1 > 0 (1)
This assumption guarantees that the technology is worth developing. More
precisely, it implies that it would be protable for a single rm to invest in the
development of one of the two innovations if that ensured it a prot equal to
one half of the technologys value. The rm would invest 1 at each time period
dt, and would expect a prot 2 with a probability . Its expected prot would
thus be equal to
 
2   1

= (r + ).
I use the model to compare two di¤erent patent policy settings. In a rst
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setting, each innovation is patentable. It is thus possible, although not necessary,
that each rm patents a di¤erent innovation. The disclosure of a rst patent
informs the other rm that it can stop trying to develop this innovation, and
that it will have to share the rent if it patents the second innovation2 . In a
second setting, only the bundled technology is patentable. Therefore a rm
must develop both innovations by its own means in order to obtain a patent. In
both cases I assume that patents confer perfect protection against imitation.
When rms are unable to include both innovations in a single patent, they
grant separate licenses on their respective patents, which creates a double mar-
ginalization problem (Shapiro, 2001). This issue can be captured in a simple
way in the context of a competitive industry that produces at zero cost and uses
two complementary innovations i = 1; 2, each licensed at royalty Ri (i = 1; 2)
per unit of output. If the patents are held by di¤erent rms, the competitive
price is equal to p = R1+R2, whereas the price is R when a single rm licenses
the innovations as a bundle. Assuming a standard demand function for the
product, Shapiro (2001) shows that in a Nash equilibrium, (prot maximizing)
uncoordinated licensors set their royalties so that R1 + R2 > R. As a result,
total prots 0 are smaller than the prot  a single licensor would have made.
This is the standard result of the Cournot (1838) theorem. If patents are held
by di¤erent rms, each licensor sets its royalty without noticing the fact that
high royalties decrease the other licensors prot. Therefore royalties are beyond
the level R that maximizes total prots. In this paper, I denote the prot loss
due to double marginalization by c =  0, which corresponds to the di¤erence
between monopoly and total Cournot prots. Since this cost results from the
dispersion of complementary patents between di¤erent owners, I refer to it as
2Note that the e¤ect of disclosure is not the same with cumulative innovations as with
complementary innovations. In the former case, the achievement of one innovation is necessary
to enable the development of the other one. In the latter case, rms invest simultaneously in
both innovations, and react to the disclosure of a patent by stopping their investment in the
underlying innovation.
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the scattering cost in the rest of the paper. I moreover assume from now on
that it is exogenous.
For simplicity, I focus the analysis on the rmsprivate surplus, although the
double marginalization issue also a¤ects consumers through prices. In Section 4,
I use the sum of the innovatorsexpected prots as a measure of social welfare,
the most e¢ cient organization of R&D thus being the one that maximizes total
prots. Although biased, this approach to e¢ ciency does not a¤ect my key
result. If consumer surplus were taken into account, social e¢ ciency would still
require that trivial innovations not be patentable3 .
2 Innovations can be patented separately
Consider rst the patent race when innovations can be patented separately.
The dynamic game is represented in Figure 1. As a rst step, the rms decide
simultaneously whether to enter the race or not. Since the two innovations are
symmetrical and have identical and independent Poisson hit rates , a rm will
either invest in R&D for both innovations, or not invest at all. If the rms decide
to invest, they have equal chances to be the rst one to achieve and patent an
innovation.
At Node n = 1; 2, rm n has just developed, patented and disclosed a rst
innovation. In this case both rms must decide either to continue investing for
the second innovation, or to give up. I denote by vni (x1; x2), rm is expected
payo¤ at those Node n = 1; 2, where xi 2 f0; 1g indicates whether rm i = 1; 2
3Formally, introducing consumer surplus would not change the analysis of investment
strategies in Sections 2 and 3. In Section 4, it would imply three modications in the ex-
pression of social surplus. First, the prot  generated by the technology would be replaced
with a parameter w equal to the sum of  and the consumer net surplus from the consump-
tion of the good produced with the technology. Second, the private scattering cost c would
be replaced with a public scattering cost parameter s equal to the sum of c and the loss of
net consumer surplus due to double marginalization. Third the private discount rate r would
be replaced with a social discount rate er. Formally, all these changes are equivalent to a vari-
ation of the parameter in the total "private" expected surplus. Hence they would not change
Propositions 3 and 4.
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decides to give up (xi = 0) or to continue investing in the second innovation
(xi = 1).
Figure 1: The patent race when innovations can be patented separately
The equilibrium concept is sub-game perfection. I proceed backwards to
identify the equilibria in pure strategies. Consider rst Node 1. Firm 1 has just
patented an innovation, and both rms have to decide whether to continue or
not. Table 1 shows the expected payo¤s to 1 and 2 at this node.
 
v11 (x1; x2) ; v
1
2 (x1; x2)

x2 = 0 x2 = 1
x1 = 0 (0; 0)

( c2 )
r+ ;
( c2 ) 1
r+

x1 = 1

 1
r+ ; 0
 
( 3 c2 ) 1
r+2 ;
( c2 ) 1
r+2

Table 1. Firmsexpected payo¤s after 1 has patented a rst innovation
If both rms decide to stay in the race, each rm incurs an R&D cost 1 at
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each time period dt until the second innovation has been achieved. There is
a probability  that rm 1 achieves the second innovation in time period dt.
If this occurs, the payo¤ to rm 1 is  (since it has already patented the rst
innovation), while the payo¤ to rm 2 is 0. But there is also a probability 
that rm 2 innovates before rm 1. In this case, the rms have to share the
prot and incur the scattering cost c, leading to symmetrical individual pay-
o¤s of (   c) =2. Finally the expected payo¤s to rms 1 and 2 in time period
dt are  +  (   c) =2   1 and  (   c) =2   1 respectively. As the time of
achievement of the second innovation has exponential distribution with parame-
ter 2, the present expected payo¤s to rms 1 and 2 are respectively v11 (1; 1) =
( (3   c) =2  1) = (r + 2) and v12 (1; 1) = ( (   c) =2  1) = (r + 2).
If rm 2 gives up, its continuation payo¤ is v12 (x; 0) = 0; x 2 f0; 1g. Firm 1
still incurs an R&D cost of 1 at each time period dt. It achieves the second inno-
vation with a probability , for a payo¤. Since rm 1 remains alone, the time of
achievement of the second innovation has now an exponential distribution with
parameter , leading to a continuation payo¤ of v11 (1; 0) = (   1) = (r + ).
Lemma 1 Assume that a rm has patented a rst innovation.
Then if  c2  1 both rms continue to invest in R&D to develop the second
innovation.
If  c2 <
1
 the rm that patented the rst innovation keeps investing in
R&D to develop the second innovation, while the other rm stops investing in
R&D.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Lemma 1 summarizes the outcomes of the subgame at Nodes 1 and 2 (see
Figure 1). The rm that patents an innovation rst will always keep investing
in R&D in order to develop the second innovation. It is never protable for it
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to stop investing and rely on the other rm to complete the technology, since it
would then have to share prots which it could appropriate entirely by achieving
the last innovation. Under these conditions the other rm will stay in the race
only if  c2  1 , and will otherwise give up. This implies that a high scattering
cost is not incurred. Since only one rm continues to invest in the development
of the second innovation, the scattering cost is replaced with longer innovation
delays.
Consider now Node 0 on Figure 1. At this node, no innovation has been
developed yet and the rms have to decide whether to invest in R&D or not, in
order to develop the technology. I assume that rms cannot avoid competition
by agreeing ex ante to coordinate their R&D investments. I also assume that a
rm cannot wait for its competitor to patent a rst innovation before investing
and trying to patent the second innovation4 . I therefore look for the conditions
under which it is protable for both rms to invest simultaneously in both
research lines, and show that this is the case when parameter  is high enough.
To identify the conditions under which the rms can expect a positive prot
from a patent race, I must calculate their payo¤s in two di¤erent cases, depend-
ing on what would happen after a rst innovation had been patented (Nodes 1
and 2). Let Vc denote the expected prot of a rm at Node 0 when both rms
keep investing after a rst innovation has been patented. Conversely, let Va de-
note the expected prot at Node 0 when a rm gives up after a rst innovation
has been patented. To simplify the presentation, I calculate these payo¤s for
rm 1.
Let us rst consider the case where both rms continue investing at Nodes
1 and 2. If the rms invest at Node 0, there is a probability 2 that rm 1
achieves one of the innovations in time period dt (so that the rms arrive at
4This assumption simplies the analysis. It is realistic since the other rm could counter
this strategy e¤ectively by relying on secrecy rather patenting to protect its rst innovation.
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Node 1). Then the expected payo¤ to rm 1 is v11 (1; 1), as given in Table 1.
There is an equal probability 2 that rm 2 achieves one of the innovations in
time period dt (so that the rms arrive at Node 2). In this case, the payo¤ to
rm 1 is v21 (1; 1). Since each rm invests in parallel in two research lines, the
time of achievement of the rst innovation has an exponential distribution with
parameter 4. The present expected payo¤ to rm 1 if it enters is nally
Vc =
2v11 (1; 1) + 2v
2
1 (1; 1)  2
r + 4
: (2)
Let us assume now that the rm that did not innovate gives up at Nodes 1
and 2. If the rms invest at Node 0, there is a probability 2 that rm 1 achieves
one of the innovations in time period dt (so that the rms arrive at Node 1).
The expected payo¤ to rm 1 is then v11 (1; 0). There is an equal probability 2
that rm 2 achieves one of the innovations in time period dt (so that the rms
arrive at Node 2). In this case, the payo¤ to rm 1 is v21 (0; 1) = 0. Since the
time of achievement of the rst innovation has an exponential distribution with
parameter 4, the present expected payo¤ to rm 1 if it enters is nally
Va =
2v11 (1; 0)  2
r + 4
: (3)
Lemma 2 There exist c () = c2 +
2
 +
r
22
, a () = 2 +
r
2
and f () = c+ 2
such that:
- if  > Max fc () ; f ()g, both rms continue after the rst patent.
- if a () <  < f (), one rm gives up after the rst patent.
- if  < Min fc () ; a ()g, the rms do not start the R&D race.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Lemma 2 is illustrated in Figure 2 for a particular value of r, without loss
of generality. Given the discount rate and scattering cost parameters r and c,
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the rms start an R&D race if the expected prot  is large enough and if the
expected time of development 1= is short enough. After the rst innovation has
been patented and disclosed, both rms continue if the expected market prot
 is large enough. The possible scattering cost c then has a negligible impact
on the incentive power of . By contrast, the scattering cost c really matters
when the market prot  is low. In that case the rm that has not innovated
yet prefers to quit the race rather than competing in R&D for (   c) =2. The
innovator then develops the second innovation alone. It avoids the scattering
cost but must expect a longer delay until the complete technology is developed.
It is worth to noting here that the fact of one rm giving up after the rst
patent has been disclosed, extends the range of parameters for which the rms
will invest in R&D, for a < c when  >
p
r=c. In that respect, patent
disclosure increases the social surplus.
Figure 2: Equilibria when the innovations can be patented separately
Proposition 3 deals with the social impact of patent disclosure, measured
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as the di¤erence between the rmsaggregate prots when a rm gives up and
when both rms continue after the rst patent.
Proposition 3 Equilibria in which a rm gives up always maximize the rms
expected surplus. Equilibria in which both rms continue maximize the rms
expected surplus i¤   g (), where g () = c+ cr + 1 . If  < g (), the rms
expected surplus would be greater if one rm gave up.
Figure 3 indicates the di¤erence between the equilibrium surplus (in bold)
and the other scenario for each equilibrium. It shows rstly that the equilibrium
in which a rm gives up after the rst patent is always welfare improving. This
conrms and generalizes Lemma 2s nding that the possibility to give up after
the rst patent disclosure extends the range of parameters (to a <  < c) for
which rms will invest. In other cases (e.g. c <  < f ()), the rms would
start the R&D race anyway, but would maximize the total expected payo¤s if
a single rm developed the second innovation alone. This is because, given the
low value of , avoiding the scattering cost is more important than delaying the
second innovation.
The social e¢ ciency of equilibria in which both rms continue after the rst
patent is more ambiguous. The rms decision to continue is e¢ cient when
prots are large ( > g ()). The scattering cost is then negligible and it is
more e¢ cient if the technology is completed quickly. If the market prot is not
large enough and/or the innovation takes time to develop (f () <  < g ()),
it would be more e¢ cient for a rm to give up after the rst patent. However
the rm that did not innovate prefers to continue, which reduces the payo¤ that
rms can expect at the beginning of the race. This is equivalent to a patent
race pattern where rms invest in excess to appropriate an innovation rent.
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Figure 3: Disclosure and social surplus
3 Innovations must be bundled prior to patent-
ing
Consider now the patent race when innovations must be bundled prior to patent-
ing. In this case, a rm that has achieved one innovation does not disclose it
because it is not protected against imitation. As a result, a rm has to achieve
the technology entirely on its own in order to obtain a patent. There is no
scattering cost and the payo¤ to the patentee is always .
In these conditions the patent race is a two hits one, as represented in
Figure 4. The rms initially invest in each innovation simultaneously (Node 0).
Thus a rm incurs the R&D cost of two research lines until it has achieved the
rst innovation (Nodes 1 and 21 for rm 1, and Nodes 2 and 12 for rm 2), or
alternatively until the other rm has patented the whole technology. In the rst
case, the rm continues to incur the R&D cost of one research line until it or
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the other rm has patented the technology. In the second case, the R&D race
ends with the patent.
Figure 4: The patent race when the innovations must be bundled prior to patent-
ing
Let us calculate the rmspayo¤s when innovations are bundled prior to
patenting. Let uni denote the expected payo¤ of rm i = 1; 2 at Node n 2
f1; 2; 12; 21g. At Node 12, the expected payo¤s of the rms are equal: u121 =
u122 = u
12. Each rm has already achieved one innovation and the rst rm
that will achieve the second innovation will win the race. (A similar argument
can be made for Node 21.) Each rm incurs an R&D cost 1 at each time period
dt until the complete technology has been achieved. There is a probability 
that rm 1 achieves a second innovation in time period dt. In this case rm1s
payo¤ is  and rm 2s payo¤ is 0. Symmetrically, there is a probability 
that rm 2 achieves a second innovation. Its payo¤ is  and that of rm 1 is
0. Since the time of achievement of the most recent innovation has exponential
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distribution with parameter 2, the present continuation payo¤ to each rm is
u12 = (   1) = (r + 2).
I can now compute the continuation payo¤s to rms 1 and 2 at Node 1. At
this Node, only rm 1 has already achieved an innovation. I will thus denote
by u11 the expected payo¤s to rm 1, and by u
1
2 the expected payo¤ to the rm
that has not innovated yet, namely rm 2. Firm 1 incurs an R&D cost 1 at each
time period dt in order to achieve the second innovation, while rm 2 incurs the
R&D cost of two parallel research lines. The probability that rm 1 achieves its
second innovation in time period dt is . If it succeeds the race ends, implying
that its payo¤ is  and rm 2s payo¤ is 0. On the other hand the probability
that rm 2 achieves an innovation in time period dt is 2. The rms will then
be at Node 12 and their payo¤s will be u12. The time of achievement of the next
innovation has exponential distribution with parameter 3. The rmsexpected
payo¤s after one rm has achieved a rst innovation can thus be expressed as
follows:
u11 =
 + 2u12   1
r + 3
u12 =
2u12   2
r + 3
The last step consists in calculating the payo¤s to the rms at Node 0, if
they enter the race. At this stage no innovation has been achieved yet, so that
both rms invest in both research lines. Therefore each rm incurs a cost 2
in time period dt. One rm, say rm 1, may achieve an innovation with a
probability 2 at each time period dt. In this case its payo¤ is u11. There is
also a probability 2 that rm 2 achieves an innovation in time period dt. The
payo¤ to rm 1 is then u21 = u
1
2. As there is a probability 4 that either rm 1
or rm 2 achieves an innovation in time period dt, the expected entry payo¤ to
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each rm is U = 2u
1
1+2u
1
2 2
r+4 : After some calculations this writes:
U = 2
63   r2   162   8r+ r2
(r + 2) (r + 3) (r + 4)
(4)
Firms enter the patent race only if U  0, which can be expressed as a
condition on :
U  0 ,   (r + 4)
2
2 (r + 6)
 b () (5)
4 Optimal patentability requirement
The last step consists in comparing the social e¤ects of the patent races under
the two policy settings. I consider as optimal the policy that yields the greatest
expected production surplus. The welfare comparison thus takes into account
the expected total costs of the R&D, the delay of achievement of the whole
technology, and the possible scattering cost. I show that for su¢ ciently large
values of the Poisson hit rate , a strong patentability requirement is optimal.
Propositions 1 and 2 state that this result holds when the innovations can be
calculated separately, irrespective of the rmscontinuation strategies.
Proposition 4 (i) The requirement that innovations be bundled prior to patent-
ing prevents the development of innovations with a low value (e.g. such that
Min fa () ;c ()g   < b ()) that would be developed if they were patentable
separately.
(ii) Suppose  c2 >
1
 so that all rms continue their R&D after a rst
patent. In that case, c > 0 always exists so that patenting separate innovations
is optimal if  < c and patenting bundled innovations is optimal otherwise.
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(iii) Suppose now that  c2 <
1
 so that one rm abandons R&D after a rst
patent. If r  2c , then a > 0 exists so that patenting separate innovations is
optimal if  < a and patenting bundled innovations is optimal if  > a . If
r < 2c , patenting separate innovations is optimal.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
Proposition 4 rstly states that requiring that innovations be bundled prior
to patenting may prevent the achievement of some innovations that would be
developed if they were patentable separately. This result concerns innovations
which take a long time to develop. It is due to the ine¢ cient R&D cost dupli-
cations that could be prevented by means of patent disclosure. Conversely, the
other parts of the Proposition show that bundling innovations prior to patenting
may be more e¢ cient when innovations can be developed rapidly.
Consider rstly the case in which the second rm stays in the race after a
rst innovation has been patented. Proposition 4 establishes the existence of
a threshold value of the R&D Poisson hit rate  above which only the com-
plete technology should be patentable. Since a low  means that the expected
time to achieve the innovation is long, it follows that each innovation should
be patentable separately if it takes a long time to achieve. In contrast innova-
tions that can be developed quickly should be combined with complementary
innovations prior to patenting.
Bundling innovations prior to patenting can be welfare-improving because
it makes it possible to avoid the scattering cost. This benet must however be
balanced with additional R&D costs. If there is no disclosure, the rm that did
not innovate continues to invest in both innovations, which is socially wasteful.
When developing an innovation takes a long time (low ), it is worth taking the
risk of incurring a scattering cost if it can save R&D costs. Innovations should
thus be patentable separately. When innovations can be developed rapidly (high
17
), R&D cost duplications are negligible and there is no need to incur the
scattering cost. Innovations should thus be bundled prior to patenting.
Consider now the case in which the value of the technology is low while the
scattering cost is high, so that a second rm gives up after the rst patent. In
that case the scattering cost is never incurred and the e¢ cient policy depends
on a trade-o¤ between R&D duplications and short delay on the one hand, and
R&D limitation (since a rm gives up) and longer delay, on the other. Since
the ow of R&D is normalized to 1, the outcome of this trade-o¤ depends on
the discount rate r. Proposition 4 states that if r > 2=c there is a threshold
value of the R&D Poisson hit rate  above which only the complete technology
should be patentable. In that case the opportunity cost of postponing the
development of the complete technology is high. It is thus worthwhile allowing
R&D duplications in order to accelerate this development when the cost of these
duplications is acceptable, that is, when the R&D process is rapid (high ). If
r < 2=c, delays matter less and separate patenting should prevail to avoid cost
duplications.
5 Conclusion and policy implications
This paper compares two R&D race settings in which two rms invest to de-
velop two complementary innovations. In the rst setting, each innovation is
patentable separately, while in the second setting they must be bundled prior
to patenting. Both policies have some advantages. When innovations are
patentable separately, the disclosure of interim patents extends the range of
protable innovations and improves the e¢ ciency of R&D investments. A rm
abandons the race after the rst patent if the expected market prot is low,
which limits R&D cost duplications and avoids the cost generated by scattered
patents. When innovations must be bundled prior to patenting, the scattering
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cost is always avoided but the absence of patent disclosure generates useless
R&D duplications. Compared with separate patents, this policy generally im-
proves the e¢ ciency of R&D when the expected development delay is short,
although it may also slow down the development of the lowest value innova-
tions.
From a policy perspective, discrimination between trivial innovations and
innovations that take a long time to develop is possible, by enforcing a severe
"inventive step" requirement. In Europe, an innovation can be patented only
if (i) it is new, (ii) it has an industrial application and (iii) it constitutes
an inventive step, meaning that it must solve an objective technical problem.
In U.S. patent law, an innovation must be new, useful and non-obvious to be
patentable. The latter requirement means that the innovation should not be
viewed as obvious by someone skilled in the technology of the particular eld,
and is practically equivalent to the European "inventive step" test.
The idea that a lenient enforcement of these requirements can lead to the
ine¢ cient patenting of elementary pieces of technology has been expressed by
several authors in the legal literature. Barton (2003) takes the surprising exam-
ple of co¤ee cup holders to argue that a weak application of the non-obviousness
standard in the U.S. has led to the granting of too many complementary patents
on one object. In a paper on the intellectual property protection of software,
Lemley (1995) develops a comparable argument in the case of software where
he states that patents could protect "either the idea of a program or [each] of
its subroutines".
The present paper upholds policy arguments that emphasize the importance
of a severe application of this patentability requirement as a means to limit the
size of "patent thickets" and to promote innovation in sectors where complemen-
tary innovations are frequent (Ja¤e, 2000; Barton, 2003; FTC, 2003). It applies
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in particular to the current European debate on the patentability of computer
driven inventions. Software innovations have generally been patentable in the
U.S. since 1995, and obtaining software patents has been an easy task since then
(Lemley, 2001; Barton, 2003; FTC, 2003). In contrast, the European Patent Of-
ce has been more severe in applying patentability requirements (Graham et alii,
2002)5 . A European Directive aimed at updating and clarifying the rules for
software patentability should therefore ensure that the current severity of the
EPO regarding patent applications is maintained.
The analysis carried out in this paper has several limitations that could be
addressed by extending the model. Such limits primarily concern the strategies
that innovators can develop to reduce the costs resulting from patent scattering.
In some cases, rms can circumvent disclosed patents to avoid buying a license.
Ex ante agreements such as cross-licensing and patent pools are another possible
strategy to mitigate scattering costs, and warrant further analysis. Finally, it
may be especially interesting to study grant back clauses designed ex ante to
prevent scattering costs after complementary innovations have been developed
and patented.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Appendix 1: Proof of Lemma 1
Let rm 1 be the rm that patented the rst innovation. The Proof is derived
directly from Table 1.
(i) I show rst that continuing is always a dominant strategy for rm 1.
If rm 2 continues, then rm 1 will continue if
( 3 c2 ) 1
r+2 >
( c2 )
r+ or
r (  1) +   2  1 + c22 > 0, which is always true when inequality (1)
holds.
If rm 2 gives up, then rm 1 will continue if  1r+ > 0. This is always true
under inequality (1).
(ii) I show afterwards that the best response of rm 2 to rm 1s continuation
strategy depends on the sign of  c2   1 .
If rm 1 continues, then rm 2 will also continue if
( c2 ) 1
r+2 > 0, which is
true if  c2  1 :Hence if inequality (1) holds, rm 2 will give up.
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6.2 Appendix 2: Proof of Lemma 2
 Putting the expressions of v11 (1; 1) and v21 (1; 1) into equation (2) gives
Vc = 2
22
 
   c2
  r   4
(r + 2) (r + 4)
, and Vc > 0 if  > c2 +
2
 +
r
22
 c.
 From equation (3) and the expression of v11 (1; 0) in Table 1; I have Va =
2
 
2   2  r
(r + ) (r + 4)
= 2 (r + )
 1
(r + 4)
 1  
2   2  r, and Va > 0 if
 > 2 +
r
2
 a.
 I now study c   a
c   a = c2 + 2 + r22   2   r2 = c2  
r
22
This is positive i¤  >
p
r
c  ca
 Wemoreover know that a rm gives up after the rst innovation is patented
i¤  < c+ 2  f ().
I now study the sign of a   f ().
I have a   f () = r2   c2 .
This expression is positive i¤  < ca. Hence a > f () if  < ca.
I study nally the sign of c   f ().
I have c   f () = r22   c2 .
This expression is positive i¤  < ca: Hence c > f () if  < ca.
6.3 Appendix 3: Proof of Proposition 3
It is more e¢ cient that both rms continue after the rst patent i¤ Vc Va > 0.
Vc   Va = 2
 
r  r   cr  c2
(r + ) (r + 2) (r + 4)
is positive if (   c) r   r   c2 > 0
or, which is equivalent, if  > c+ cr +
1
  g ().
The function g () is rstly decreasing on ]0; ca] and then increasing on
[ca;1)
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6.4 Appendix 4: Proof of Proposition 4
We prove successively points (ii), (iii) and (i).
(ii) When  c2 >
1
 , bundling innovations prior to patenting is optimal i¤
U > Vc. I have U Vc = ( 2) (r + 3) 1 (r + 2) 1 (r + 4) 1
 
r + 4+ r  cr  3c2
.
This expression is positive i¤ r+4+r cr 3c2 < 0 or, put di¤erently,
i¤  < c + 3cr   4r   1  e1 (), where e1 () is a continuous and increasing
function of  from ]0;+1) to ( 1;+1).
One can check that e1 (ac)  f (ac) = 3cr p rc   4r   3p r
c
=   4r < 0. Hencee1 (ac) < f (ac). Since on [ac;1), e1 () is increasing towards +1 while
f () is decreasing towards c, it follows that there always exists a threshold valuee2 > ac such that e1 () < f () if ac <  < e1 and e1 () > f () if e1 < .
When  c2 >
1
 , we can thus dene   e1 () so that for each set (; r)
bundling innovations prior to patenting is optimal if  > .
(iii) When , c2 <
1
 bundling innovations prior to patenting is optimal i¤
U > Va.
I have U Va = 4 (r + ) 1 (r + 2) 1 (r + 3) 1 (r + 4) 1
 
r2   r2   22   4r.
This expression is positive i¤ r2   r2   22   4r > 0 or, put di¤erently, i¤
 >
r2 + 22 + 4r
r2
=
r
2
+
4

+
2
r
 e2 ().
e2 () is a continuous and decreasing function of  from ]0;+1) to 2
r
;+1

.
Moreover one can check that e2 () f () = 2+ r2+ 2r c and e2 (ac) > f (ac).
Since on [ac;1), e2 () is decreasing towards 2
r
while f () is decreasing to-
wards c, it follows that there exists a threshold value e2 > ac such thate1 () < f () i¤ c2 > 1r .
In that case, there exists a threshold   e2 () above which bundling in-
novations prior to patenting is optimal for all 2  1r , which is always the case
since 2 >
c
2 and
c
2 >
1
r . Otherwise, independent patenting always prevails.
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(i) We need to prove that b () > c () when  c2 >
1
 , while b () >
a () when  c2  1 , or put di¤erently that
b () > Min fa () ; c ()g (6)
Proving that b () > a () when  c2  1 is straightforward. Indeed we
have b ()  a () = 46+r > 0.
The proof that b () > c () when  c2 >
1
 can be derived from the
Proof of point (ii). We know that U < Vc when  > e1 (), where e1 () is a
continuous and increasing function of  from ]0;+1) to ( 1;+1). We also
know that e1 (ac) < f (ac) = c (ac). Since c () is decreasing while e1 ()
is increasing it follows that c () > e1 () when  < ac. Thus  = c ()
implies that Vc = 0 while U < 0 when  < ac. It follows that b () > c ()
when  < ac. Oberving that  < ac ,  c2 > 1 we have thus proved that
b () > c () when  c2 >
1
 .
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